Bretton Woods Breakdown explores the dramatic collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, a monetary order established after World War II. This book attributes the system's failure to escalating U.S. inflation and global economic imbalances, revealing how these factors overwhelmed its safeguards. It highlights the fragility of international monetary systems, the consequences of unchecked inflation, and the risks of global economic imbalances. The book examines the political economy of the era.
The book chronicles the events from 1971 to 1973, beginning with the system's design and function in maintaining stable exchange rates. It then analyzes the growing pressures of the late 1960s, particularly the inflationary pressures from the U.S., fueled by the Vietnam War, which led to an oversupply of dollars. One pivotal moment discussed is Nixon's decision to suspend the dollar's convertibility to gold in August 1971. The book also examines attempts to salvage the system through the Smithsonian Agreement.
Through archival documents, trade data, and policy reports, the book offers empirical evidence of these claims. It uniquely connects domestic economic policies with international monetary stability, showing how internal pressures within the U.S. undermined the global order.
Ultimately, understanding the failures of Bretton Woods provides valuable insights into managing international monetary relations and promoting a more stable financial environment.
